What Iraq and Somalia Have in Common By Michael Shank Arab News[WEBSITE VERSION] January 16, 2008
In the United States' global war on terrorism, Iraq long ago became ground zero both for American forces and those eager to wage war against the West. But it has since also become a formula of sorts for US intervention in other key target areas. South of Iraq, in Somalia, the patterns are near identical and the consequences equally dire.
The only difference is that this East African country has been near completely forgotten by US Congress, save for the occasional Sen. Russ Feingold or Representative Don Payne who remains engaged either because of their Somali-American constituents or because of foreign affairs committee assignments, whereas Iraq remains pervasive in American politics.
But in both Iraq and Somalia, the patterns are poignantly paralleling: Both countries remain under occupation by foreign forces. In Iraq, the US presence was boosted recently with a troop surge that now has stationed forces on every major intersection in Baghdad. While attacks have diminished as a result, this increased presence merely calls for a longer occupation, not a shorter one. In Somalia, the situation is similar. The Ethiopian presence permeates most urban centers, Mogadishu and Baidoa especially, patrolling main streets with tank and gun. Much like Iraq, with no viable military or police force of its own, the Somali government remains reliant on the Ethiopian occupation to ensure its hold on power.
Both countries' occupiers have called for premature reconciliation. In Iraq, the US called quickly for reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites without first addressing the legitimate socio-economic and political grievances of either party. Keeping Sunnis out of power then requesting that they make amends with the in-power Shiites was untenable from the onset. No wonder then why reconciliation never got off the ground. In Somalia, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, who supported the Ethiopian invasion, has consistently called for a similarly premature reconciliation process, providing funding for last year's non-inclusive congress. Again, this process, like Iraq, failed. Parties refused to participate until Ethiopian forces withdrew. Reconciling while occupied made little sense for many Somalis.
Both countries' governments do not, in a democratic sense, represent the populace. In Iraq, the Shiite-led government continues to alienate the Sunni minority, an ironic reversal of Saddam Hussein's years. This has long caused conflict among Sunnis, feeling unrepresented by the political institutions mandated to represent the people. In Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), internationally handpicked in 2004, will not allow free and fair elections until 2009. Furthermore, the TFG does not adequately represent the myriad of clans and sub-clans throughout Somalia, generating further unrest among the unrepresented.
Both countries maintain Northern provinces that continue to demand sovereignty and autonomy, a result of the lack of attention paid by each country's political center and apparatus. In Iraq, the Kurdish north considers itself separate from the motherland and many of its political and economic decision-making is done without Baghdad's consent. In Somalia, the northern Somaliland and Puntland provinces are continuing their quest to be free of the political purview of Baidoa, the country's capital. Not surprisingly, there are resource access and distribution issues underlying both countries' cases, a dynamic rarely, if ever, addressed by intervening forces.
A smattering of other similarities remains between Iraq and Somalia. Neither country manages a strong UN peacekeeping presence, with Somalia struggling to rally troops beyond the 8,000-strong Uganda presence. Neither country is addressing basic humanitarian issues. The war in Iraq has displaced 4 million people, while the war in Somalia has displaced 400,000. Moreover, majorities in both countries lack access to clean water, effective sanitation, reliable electricity and staffed hospitals. Neither country has a great track record in protecting its civil society, with Somalia's TFG record perhaps the worst given its mortal raids on civilians, frequent attacks on non-governmental organizations, and continuing abuse of journalists.
Bush is near claiming victory in Iraq while the UK's Lord Malloch-Brown recently lauded the TFG's internal confirmation of a cabinet as a sign of positive development. This formula, borne in Iraq and now present in Somalia, is deeply troubling because it relies solely on military solutions and fails to foster viable and sustainable social, economic or political sectors. As US war clouds hover over Iran and Pakistan, one wonders if the formula is seeking new ground on which to test its methodology. Let's hope not. The mess in Iraq and Somalia, not to mention Afghanistan, demand our undivided political and moral attention.
— Michael Shank is an analyst with George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.