Talking Tough: How Obama Can Fight Extremism in Pakistan By Michael Shank International Herald Tribune/Daily News[WEBSITE VERSION] August 14, 2007
For those of us who believe in diplomacy, Senator Barack Obama's recent pledge to dialogue with Cuba, North Korea and Iran offered a much-needed ray of hope. Amidst the security tough-talk by Democratic presidential hopefuls, at least one leading candidate was committed to a conversation. Ironically, undermining her own campaign slogan ("Let the Conversation Begin") Senator Hillary Clinton quickly dismissed it as naive.
For those of us who think that a United States deployment of nuclear weapons would spark a maelstrom across the Middle East and Central/South Asia, Obama's refusal to target such weapons on al Qaeda offered an even brighter ray of hope. Finally, a candidate emerged that was courageous enough to challenge the lemming-like walk towards a Bush-lite security policy.
However, for those of us who hoped Obama would offer a real alternative in dealings with the Middle East and Central/South Asia, given his disapproval of the Iraq war and aforesaid promotion of diplomacy and refusal to engage nukes, Obama's newfound enthusiasm for Pakistan dashed previous hopes.
Criticized for his ill-fated Woodrow Wilson Center speech - e.g. "getting off the wrong battlefield in Iraq, and taking the fight to the terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan" and "if the U.S. has high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will" - Obama surprisingly has not since changed course or rescinded comments.
Why the military bravado now? Was it because Clinton handily dismissed Obama's direct diplomacy and nuclear weapons embargo? Likely Obama felt the need to dispel the notion that he was naively dovish and sought to define his campaign with a troops-out-of-Iraq-and-into-Pakistan maneuver. Sadly, however, this distinguishes him little and likens him more to President Bush than ever before.
If Obama wants to come out swinging on terrorism to avoid being ushered out of the ring by Clinton, perhaps a lesson on Pakistan would help. To begin with, an overt attack by U.S. forces on Pakistan's semi-autonomous regions - the provinces bordering Afghanistan inhabited for centuries by sovereign tribal leaders - does more damage than good, for three reasons. First, the U.S. and Pakistan's success rate in killing high-value targets in the provinces has been negligible. Ample mistakes have enraged locals, turning former allies in enemies. Obama's ability in 2008 to better decipher targets in the barren, unforgiving terrain is hardly realizable.
Second, any U.S. attack on the tribes merely serves to further instigate local and regional opposition, thus fueling (not reducing) terrorist activity. The tribes perceive themselves as sovereign entities, not to be ruled by outside forces. It was this resistance that thwarted British imperialism in South Asia in the early 20th century and it is this attitude that will brace for a U.S. attack with equal vitriol.
Third, the majority of people in Pakistan, once on the fence vis-a-vis their willingness to partner with the U.S. in the war on terrorism, will quickly jump off if Obama jumps in. Already, Pakistani-Americans are protesting Obama, having lost faith in a candidate once considered a favorite. Attack the tribal regions and Pakistan, as an ally, is lost completely.
Thus, the way to win in Pakistan requires much more than willingness to bomb. Obama should know there is nothing new about this approach. Last year, Richard Armitage, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, allegedly threatened President Musharraf's intelligence director that if Pakistan failed to comply in the U.S. war on terror, it would be bombed back to the Stone Age. Consequently, if Obama wants differentiate from the pack yet still talk tough on terrorism, then he should consider the following:
First, withhold military aid from Musharraf until assurances are given guaranteeing free and fair elections. Allowing Musharraf (who is prepping the constitution for an extended stay) free reign as an unelected president, severely undermines U.S. credibility among the Pakistani public. Moreover, the tribes never liked Musharraf; continued U.S. support for the dictator will only stimulate more extremism.
Second, transfer U.S. military aid to Pakistan into economic aid. Since 2001, more than $10b US dollars in military aid have been funneled to Musharraf and for what? Musharraf's military is now hated by most if not all parties in Pakistan, even judges. Simply put, Musharraf is the wrong horse to back. Ensure that economic aid is provided to the very impoverished, the ones ripe for recruitment by the Taliban and al Qaeda. This will be arduous and time-intensive but it will undermine recruitment.
Third, build alliances with Pakistani-Americans who are ready to help defeat extremism in Pakistan. Many diaspora are intimately networked into the religious schools (madrasas), nongovernmental organizations, businesses, law offices, and universities and could leverage U.S. interests if invited. If alienated, however, these otherwise useful resources go unutilized.
This, and more, is what it means to be tough. Why, because it requires more prudence, patience, and partnership than a quick statement detailing an attack. As the U.S. learned in Iraq, a military offensive offers little chance of success. It is the political, economic, and social fronts to which one must attend. Take note Obama.
Michael Shank is an analyst with George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT with his permission.